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Faculty and Deans

The Myths and Truths That Ended
the 2000 TMDL Program
LINDA

A. MALONE*

Thirty years in the making, the total maximum daily load
(TMDL) program of section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act has
never seemed farther from effective implementation. As state
governments increasingly have flexed their regulatory muscles
with respect to the environment, ironically they have shied
away-to put it mildly-from their environmental responsibilities
under the TMDL program. Their reticence and outright opposition to their obligation to improve water quality are that much
more striking given their adamant insistence that this obligation
be reserved to and exercised by them in 1972.
Mter reviewing the checkered history of the program since
1972, state criticism of the program will be examined for its validity. Below the shallow surface of these criticisms, some unpleasant truths emerge for state opposition to the very purpose of the
TMDL program, a purpose necessary to improving the water quality of impaired waters within the United States. In light of these
truths, and the Bush administration's withdrawal of the final regulatory program, the dim prospects for the program will be projected. Finally, one inevitable truth emerges-the only
insurmountable problem with the TMDL program is the lack of
political will, at the state and federal levels, to implement it with
mandatory controls on nonpoint source pollution.

*

Marshall-Wythe Foundation Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School.

B.A. 1975, Vassar College; J.D. 1978, Duke Law School; LL.M. 1984, University of

Illinois College of Law. I would like to thank Fred Bosselman and David Callies for
first introducing me as a young attorney to the interrelationship between land use
and the environment, and Oliver Houck for his input and continuing commitment to
an effective TMDL program.
This article is based in part on an earlier article, The Myths and Truths that
Threaten the TMDL Program, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11133 (Sept. 2002),
and updated to demonstrate how the dire predictions in that article for the 2000
TMDL program were realized.
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A Troubled Past
Established in the 1972 Clean Water Act, the TMDL program
set forth in section 303(d) provides a process for identifying waters
that fail to satisfy state water quality standards, calculating the
TMDLs of a pollutant that a water body can assimilate while
maintaining applicable water quality standards, and incorporating TMDLs into the state quality planning process. However, the
potential in the TMDL program has not been fully utilized. Following the 1972 amendments, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) was kept busy establishing point source standards
and forcing states to set state water quality standards that adequately protected existing water qualities and uses. 1
In the struggle to achieve these goals, the EPA sidelined the
TMDL program, delaying the identification of pollutants appropriately included in the TMDL program, trying to instead achieve the
goals of the TMDL program through its basin planning program. 2
Although a court order finally forced the EPA to identify the
TMDL pollutants, 3 the EPA continued to allow states to ignore
their obligation to submit their TMDLs. 4 Fortunately for the
TMDL program, a series of citizen suits beginning in the 1980s
began to address this inaction, establishing the doctrine of "constructive submission," whereby the continued non-submission of
TMDLs by a state eventually becomes the submission of no
TMDLs, which requires the EPA to step in and promulgate acceptable TMDLs on the state's behalf. 5 Initially, it nevertheless
seemed as though any state submission, no matter how minimal,
would satisfy this requirement. 6 However, further litigation made
1. OLIVER A. HoucK, THE CLEAN WATER AcT TMDL PROGRAM: LAw, PoLICY AND
IMPLEMENTATION 49 (1999).
2. Id. at 50.
3. See Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(citing Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Costle, No. 78-0572 (D.D.C. June 20, 1978)); Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1353-54 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Bd. of County
Comm'rs v. Costle, No. 78-0572 (D.D.C. June 20, 1978)).
4. HoucK, supra note 1, at 51.
5. See Pronsolino, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1354 (citing Scott v. City of Hammond, 530
F. Supp. 288 (N.D. Ill. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984));
Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Thomas, No. 86-1578 BU (D. Or. June 3, 1987);
Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Alaska Ctr.
for the Env't v. Reilly, 796 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Wash. 1992), affd sub nom. Alaska
Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994).
6. See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Adamkus, 1991 WL 47374 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28,
1991); Sierra Club, North Star Chapter v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304, 1313 (D. Minn.
1993); see also Diane K. Conway, TMDL Litigation: So Now What?, 17 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 83, 95 (1997); Michael M. Wenig, How "Total" Are Total Maximum Daily Loads?-
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it clear that EPA approval of unreasonably minimal state TMDL
submissions would not be acceptable; utterly inadequate TMDL
submissions still triggered the necessity for the EPA to either
work with the state to reach a more acceptable solution or to step
in with its own TMDL list. 7
In the light of this litigation, the EPA began taking a more
aggressive approach towards the TMDL program. In November
1996, the EPA provided further guidance to the states by updating
its 1991 guidelines through a draft TMDL Program Implementation Strategy, (Strategy) which recognized the importance of
TMDL allocations in the watershed approach, extended the frequency of reporting obligations, combined report categories, and
established many EPA resources for assistance in TMDL development.s However, the Strategy did not resolve many problematic
issues, including the scope of eligible waters within the TMDL
program, the degree of scientific certainty necessary, and the role
ofnonpoint sources in the TMDL program. 9 In 1996, the EPA convened a committee under the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA) to obtain a diversity of viewpoints in resolving these
problems.1° Despite reaching an agreement over a number of difficult issues, the Committee failed to reach a consensus on
whether the TMDL process should be used to address nonpoint
source pollution. 11 At that point in time, the EPA then proceeded
to integrate these recommendations into its revision of the existing TMDL regulations. 12
While the EPA was undergoing the notice-and comment procedure in the TMDL regulations revision process, Congress also
began involving itself in the TMDL issue. The House Transportation Committee's Subcommittee on Water Resources and the Environment held hearings on the program and the proposed
changes. 13 As a result of these hearings, Congress instructed the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to address certain concerns
Legal Issues Regarding the Scope of Watershed Based Pollution Control under the
Clean Water Act, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 109 n.103 (1998).
7. See Idaho Sportsmen's Coalition v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962, 966-67 (W.D.
Wash. 1996); Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865, 871-72 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
8. HoucK, supra note 1, at 57.
9. Id.
10. Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs Ill: A New Framework for the Clean Water Act's
Ambient Standards Program, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,415, 10,422 (1998).
11. Id.
12. Barclay Rogers & Anne Hazlett, TMDLs: Are They Dead Letters?, AGRIC. L.
UPDATE (Am. Agric. L. Ass'n), Aug. 2001, at 4.
13. Id.

66

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

raised by the hearings, primarily whether sufficient data was
available to scientifically determine which bodies of water were
impaired, what TMDLs would be appropriate, and what the economic impact of the new regulations would be. 14 The GAO expressed substantial concerns· on both issues, emphasizing
uncertainties both in the available data and the EPA's economic
analysis of the proposed regulations. 15 Despite this negative input from Congress, the EPA promulgated its revised TMDL rule
in July 2000. 16 The final rule included several changes that substantially affect the TMDL process. For example, nonpoint
sources of pollution were explicitly included within the TMDL
framework. 17 States had to schedule the establishment of TMDLs
within ten years as of July 10, 2000, or the due date on the first
list on which the waterbody appeared, although this schedule
might be extended for five years if the original deadline could not
be met despite expeditious action. 18 Moreover, the new regulation
required that all impaired water bodies, even those for which
TMDLs were not yet required, be placed on a four-part list and
prioritized. 19 States were further required to provide an implementation plan and a "reasonable assurance" that TMDL wasteloads and load allocations would be met. 20
Some of the changes included in the new rule were controversial, especially the provisions addressing nonpoint sources and the
revisions to the TMDL schedule, and both legal and political challenges resulted. 21 The American Farm Bureau Federation, concerned about the implications of the inclusion of non point sources
14. !d.
15. See GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, WATER QuALITY, KEY EPA AND STATE DECI·
SIONS LIMITED BY INCONSISTENT AND INCOMPLETE DATA (2000), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00054.pdf. In March of 2000, GAO issued this, its first report highlighting a substantial lack of data available to determine which waterbodies
were impaired and to set appropriate TMDLs. GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, REVIEW
oF Two EPA PROPOSED REGULATIONS REGARDING WATER QuALITY MANAGEMENT
(2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00206r.pdf. GAO published this
second report in June of2000 questioning the reasonableness of EPA's economic analysis of the proposed regulations.
16. Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and
Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed.
Reg. 43,586 (July 13, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, & 130).
17. !d. at 43,588.
18. Id. at 43,590-91.
19. Id. at 43,590.
20. Id. at 43,591.
21. Rogers & Hazlett, supra note 12, at 5.
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in the TMDL program, immediately filed a petition to challenge
the new regulation. 22 Other special interest groups followed
suit. 23 Interested parties have also managed to make themselves
felt legislatively, persuading Congress not only to prohibit the
EPA from using any money from fiscal years 2000 or 2001 to fund
the changes, 24 but also to insist that the EPA hire the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences (NRC) to
analyze the TMDL program and the new regulation. 25 Congress
required NRC to determine: (1) what information is necessary to
determine the sources of pollution, the degree to which each
source impairs water quality, and how pollutant reductions
should be allocated among sources; (2) if that information can be
reliably obtained by the states, and, if the information is not already available; (3) what methodology should be used to gain the
information. 26 The NRC committee determined that there is
enough scientific information available to enable the TMDL program, finding that any scientific uncertainty could easily be compensated for in the process of fulfilling the TMDL program's goals,
although it emphasized that scientific uncertainty should not be
allowed to form the basis for unreasonable expectations. 27 The
committee also made a number of recommendations that it felt
would improve the TMDL program and expedite the achievement
of its goals. It stated, somewhat wryly, that success in the TMDL
program should be strictly predicated upon whether a waterbody
could support its designated use, to ensure that states do not lose
sight of the ultimate goal. 28 The committee also recommended
that the TMDL program include not only physical and chemical
pollutants, but also all other impacting conditions that either positively or negatively affect water quality. 29 It made several more
specific recommendations regarding the TMDL program, includ22. Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Browner, No. 00-1320 (D.C. Cir. July 18, 2000).
23. See Susan Bruninga, Nine Petitions Filed in Major Fight over Final Rule Revising TMDL Program, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2618 (Dec. 15, 2000).
24. Military Construction Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-246, 114 Stat. 511
(2000).
25. Department of Veteran Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Act, Pub. L. No. 106-377, 114 Stat. 1441, 1441A-3 (2000).
26. CoMMI'ITEE TO AssEss THE SciENTIFIC BASIS oF THE ToTAL MAxiMuM DAILY
LoAD APPROACH TO WATER PoLLUTION REDUCTION, NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNCIL, As.
SESSING THE TMDL APPROACH TO WATER QuALITY MANAGEMENT 17 (2001), available
at http://books.nap.edu/htmVtmdV.
27. ld.
28. ld. at 23-25.
29. ld. at 36-37.
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ing the designation of appropriate uses before the development of
the TMDL list, the use of biological as well as physical and chemical criteria in determining water quality achieved, and more periodic assessment of TMDL plans.3o
In response to these reactions, the EPA proposed to delay the
effective date of the revised, final regulation for eighteen months,
from October 1, 2001 to April30, 2003. 31 The EPA also proposed to
extend the deadline for the 2002 submission of states' lists of impaired waters from April 1, 2002 to October 1, 2002, 32 with the
extended deadline to allow for reconsideration of certain aspects of
the revisions, in light of the reactions to the revised rule and the
NRC report. 33 Reactions to the proposed delay were decidedly
mixed; farm groups and industry generally supported it, while environmental groups opposed it. 34 Farm groups in particular objected to the rule's regulation of nonpoint source pollution as
beyond EPA's authority, and the requirement of implementation
plans as federal presumption of local land-use policy.35 These
groups also supported the delay for states to submit their lists of
impaired waters.36
On October 18, 2002, EPA issued a final rule delaying the effective date of the July 2000 rule until April 30, 2003. On December 27, 2002, EPA went one step further and proposed to
withdraw the July 2000 rule itself, which had yet to go into effect.
On March 19, 2003, EPA signed a final rule withdrawing the July
2000 rule. Prior to the withdrawal within the EPA Office of Wastewater Management, agency staff had focused on development of
30. Id.
31. Delay of Effective Date of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System Program in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulations; and Revision of the Date for State Submission of the 2002 List of
Impaired Waters, 66 Fed. Reg. 41,817 (Aug. 9, 2001).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Susan Bruninga, Effluent Guidelines: Draft Strategy for Reviewing, Revising
Existing Guidelines expected in November, 32 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1829 (Sept. 21, 2001).
The Federal Water Quality Coalition filed one of about a dozen petitions for review of
the July 2000 rule. For examples, see Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Whitman, No. 001320 (D.C. Cir. July 18, 2000), and consolidated cases.
35. Bruninga, supra note 34, at 1829.
36. Id. EPA subsequently circulated a draft report on the total estimated costs of
the TMDL program, which reported that the costs to the industry to implement the
TMDL program could range from under $1 billion to $4.3 billion annually. EPA, THE
NATIONAL COSTS OF THE TOTAL MAxiMUM DAILY LOAD PROGRAM (DRAFT REPORT)

(2001).
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a pollutant-trading program to be incorporated into the TMDL
program. The EPA assistant administrator for water indicated
that watershed trading is more difficult than air pollutant trading
because it is more site-specific and pollutant specific. 37 Nevertheless, the EPA issued a final water quality trading program on January 13, 2003. EPA is touting its watershed policy as a partial
solution to the complex problems presented by improving water
quality, as "[t]rading capitalizes on economics of scale and the control cost differentials among and between sources."38 EPA hopes
the trading policy will encourage compliance with TMDLs by lowering the cost of compliance for industries.
On the litigation front, the Supreme Court may choose to decide a challenge to EPA's authority to establish TMDLs for water
bodies impaired by nonpoint source pollution. 39 Landowners have
challenged EPA's decision to establish TMDLs for waters affected
solely by sediment runoff from logging operations. 40 In Pronsolino
u. Marcus, 41 plaintiff, having applied for a timber-harvesting permit, received the permit from the California Department of Forestry with many serious restrictions attached, designed to reduce
soil erosion into the Garcia River. 42 The EPA had designated the
37. 68 Fed. Reg. 13,607 (Mar. 19, 2003). Top Clean Water Issues in 2002, 33
Env't Rep. (BNA) S-19 (Jan. 25, 2002). On May 15, 2002, EPA proposed the water
quality trading policy for comment. 67 Fed. Reg. 34,709 (May 15, 2002), discussed
infra, at notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
Various federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, etc.,
have agreed upon a final comprehensive science-based approach to watershed delineation and assessment on federal lands. See Notice of Final policy-Unified Federal
Policy for a Watershed Approach to Federal Land and Resource Management, 65 Fed.
Reg. 62,566 (Oct. 18, 2000), available at http://cleanwater.gov/ufp/objectives. Factors
affecting the wetlands will be considered when determining the best management
practices and priorities for both land and water uses. The agencies' watershed goals
will involve minimizing adverse water quality impacts from management programs,
minimizing the impairment of current and future uses, and restoring watersheds that
do not reach water quality standards.
38. EPA, FINAL WATER QuALITY TRADING PoLICY (2003), available at www.epa.
gov/owow/watershedltrading/Finalpolicy2003.html (Jan. 13, 2003).
39. Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. filed, 71 USLW 3531
(Feb. 6, 2003).
40. See id.; Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Cal., 2000); David K.
Bowles, Case Summary: Pronsolino v. Marcus, EPA May Impose TMDLs for Substandard Rivers Impaired Solely By Nonpoint Sources, ABA SPECIAL COMMITIEE ON AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT NEWSLETIER, June 2000, at 15; Susan Bruninga, Court Rules
TMDL Program Can Apply to River Polluted by Nonpoint Sources, 31 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 639 (Apr. 7, 2000).
41. Pronsolino, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
42. Id. at 1338.
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Garcia to be a water body that was in violation of its water quality
standards due to nonpoint source pollution, and thus required the
state to establish total maximum daily loads for the Garcia
River. 43 The state missed its deadline to submit its own TMDLs,
whereupon the EPA imposed its own TMDLs on the state. 44 The
TMDLs established a total maximum amount of sediment loading
that equated to a 60% reduction in sediment pollution from all
combined sources, including nonpoint sources such as timber harvesting.45 The plaintiff argued that its permit restrictions were
directly caused by the EPA's TMDL standard, as the California
Department of Forestry would not issue any permit that could violate it for fear oflosing funding. 46 The plaintiff then brought suit
under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging the EPA's
interpretation that the Clean Water Act allows it to establish
TMDLS on rivers polluted solely by nonpoint source pollution. 47
The Court evaluated the statutory language of the Clean
Water Act, and noted that section 303, which requires the states
to create EPA-approved water quality standards or to have the
EPA impose standards upon them, did not draw any distinctions
among navigable waters or their pollutants. 48 The court instead
found that the mandatory planning process of section 303, in order
to insure the adequate implementation of water quality standards
for all navigable waters, required the EPA to address nonpoint as
well as point sources in approving or determining TMDLs. 49
Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
lower court, holding that the determination of the TMDL for the
river by the EPA did not violate the state-federal balance of control as established by the CWA. The Court reasoned that the
TMDL program requires individual state determination by requiring states to create, implement and monitor effluents in their waters and rivers, as well as perform adequate planning, including
schedules of compliance, for new or revised water quality
standards. 50
43. ld. at 1339-40.
44. Id. at 1339.
45. ld. at 1340.
46. !d. at 1338.
47. Pronsolino, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
48. ld. at 1344-45.
49. ld. at 1347.
50. Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. filed, 71 USLW 3531
(Feb. 6, 2003).
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In December 2000, Montana submitted a total maximum
daily load plan designed to relieve impairments to water quality
caused by reduced flow in water bodies by adjusting water withdrawal. Although EPA officials commended the plan, the EPA refused to set a precedent for approving solely flow-based TMDLs,
stating that the Clean Water Act only required TMDLs for situations resulting from pollutants. 51 The EPA went on to state that
flow alterations are not included in the Clean Water Act's definition of a pollutant. 5 2 Montana officials stated that the state would
probably attempt to address water flow concerns on a voluntary
basis with water users, while focusing its resources on the actually required TMDLs.
In American Wildlands v. Browner, 53 appellant challenged
the Environmental Protection Agency's approval of some of Montana's water quality standards under the Clean Water Act. 54
Under the Clean Water Act, the states are required to develop
water quality standards for waters within their boundaries. 55 In
promulgating these standards, the states must give each body of
water a "designated use," determine and set forth the degree to
which various pollutants may be present in the water body without harming the designated use, and provide an "antidegradation
review policy" to allow the states to evaluate any activities that
might further degrade water quality. 56 The antidegradation review policy· must be consistent with the three-tier federal antidegradation policy. 57 Furthermore, the states must identify any
body of water that does not meet its standard and set forth a "total
maximum daily load" establishing the maximum amount of various pollutants that can enter the water body from all combined
sources. 58 However, EPA regulations permit states to allow water
quality requirements to be exceeded in certain areas where pollutant discharge initially meets a water body, so-called "mixing areas," so long as certain criteria are still met. 5 9 Mter developing its
51. See Susan Bruninga, Plan Addressing Flow in Montana Creek Not Covered by
TMDL Program, EPA Says, 32 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1635 (Aug. 17, 2001).
52. See id.
53. 260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001).
54. Id. at 1193.
55. Id. at 1194 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000)).
56. Id. at 1194 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A); 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.3, 130.10(d)(4),
131.6, 131.10, 131.11 (2003)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1194 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)).
59. Am. Wildlands, 260 F.3d at 1195 (citing ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, WATER QuALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK§§ 5.1.1, at 5-5 (2d ed.1994)).
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standards, each state must submit those standards to the EPA for
approval. 60 If the EPA disapproves of the standards, it must notify the state of any necessary changes, and if those standards are
not made, the EPA is required to impose appropriate standards on
the state. 61
Appellants challenged the EPA's approval of Montana's antidegradation and mixing zone policies. 62 Montana's standards
had exempted existing nonpoint sources from Tier II antidegradation review, and had further exempted subsequent nonpoint
sources from such sources when reasonable conservation practices
were used and beneficial uses were protected. 63 Montana also exempted mixing zones from its antidegradation review policy, so
long as the degradation to the water body at the periphery of the
mixing zone was not significant, although Montana did develop a
number of other strict requirements regarding mixing areas. 64
The district court found that the EPA's approval of these standards was proper, and affirmed the lower court's decision. 65
The court first determined that Congress had delegated its
authority to the EPA to apply and interpret the Clean Water Act,
both in general and in this specific instance, and its interpretation
was therefore entitled to Chevron deference and would not be
overturned unless the agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious.66 The court then determined that as the Clean Water Act
does not give the EPA the authority to regulate nonpoint source
pollution, instead merely requiring states to address the issue
through their standards and so forth, the EPA was reasonable in
interpreting that it could not disapprove an antidegradation policy
on the sole basis of how that policy addressed the issue ofnonpoint
source pollution. 67 The court then turned to the EPA's argument
that antidegradation review requirements apply to a waterbody as
a whole, rather than to a segment such as a mixing zone. 68 The
court found that this interpretation was reasonable, especially
given the practical reality beneath mixing zones, and found that
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
ANN. §
65.
66.
67.
68.

ld.
ld. at 1194 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c)(3)-(4)(A) (2000)).
ld. at 1196.
Jd. at 1195 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-317(2)(a)(b) (2002)).
Id. (citing MoNT. AoMIN. R. §§ 17.30.715(1)(c), 17.30.505(1)(b); MoNT. CooE
75-5-301(4); MoNT. AoMIN. R. §§ 17.30.505(1)(c), 17.30.506(1)).
See Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Colo. 2000).
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1198.
ld.
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the EPA was not arbitrary and capricious in approving Montana's
exemption of mixing zones from antidegradation review so long as
review of the water around such zones indicates that the overall
water quality is not being damaged. 69
The litigation and controversy over the TMDL program has to
be viewed against the backdrop of the problem of non point source
pollution, particularly from large-scale agriculture, and reticence
at the federal level to do anything more than fund voluntary controls. The EPA has requested comments on its proposed draft for
technical guidance for managing agriculture nonpoint source pollution.70 The guidance provides background information on the
problem as well as information on up-to-date reduction methods. 71
The comment period for the notice of a draft, which offered technical guidance for managing nonpoint sources of water pollution
from agriculture, published on October 17, 2000, required that
comments sent by mail be postmarked no later than January 16,
2001. 72
In January 2001, the EPA announced a proposed rule that
would change the permitting requirements for concentrated
animal feeding operations (CAF0s). 73 The EPA asked for comment on two options for defining CAFOs under NPDES permitting. The first option would establish a two-tiered system,
designating all facilities with greater than 500 animal units as
CAFOs and granting discretion to the permitting authority to determine whether smaller facilities are CAFOs. 74 The other option
would establish a three-tiered system, designating all facilities
with more than 1000 animal units as CAFOs, designating all facilities with 300-1000 animal units that meet certain other conditions as CAFOs, and granting discretion to the permitting
authority to determine that any facility is a CAFO, no matter
what the size. 75 Under the proposed rule, the number of facilities
classified as CAFOs and subject to permitting would increase to as
69. Id.
70. See Notice of Availability of Guidance for Controlling Non point Source Pollution from Agriculture and Request for Comments, 65 Fed. Reg. 61,325 (Oct. 17, 2000).
71. !d. The final guidance document, National Management Measures to Control
Nonpoint Source Pollution from Agriculture, can be viewed at http://www.epa.gov/
owow/nps/new.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
72. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 61,325-26.
73. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 2,960 (Jan. 12, 2001).
74. !d. at 2,962.
75. ld.
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many as 39,000 from the current level of 2500. The proposed rule
would also expand permitting to include dry-manure poultry operations and stand-alone immature swine and heifer operations. 76
EPA officials stated that the new regulations were not intended to
cover operations that used concentrated feeding practices during
the winter and stressed the need for public comment and input to
cover situations they had not thought of. 77 Environmentalists
were critical of the proposal, in part because the proposal did not
address the possibility of phasing out lagoons to store animal
waste. 78 As with the TMDL proposal, the CAFO proposed rule
generated a firestorm of sharply divided comments. Agricultural
groups contended the proposed requirements for nonpoint pollution were not authorized by the Clean Water Act, would be excessively costly, and challenged the co-permitting requirements
designed to extend responsibility beyond contract growers to the
corporations that own the livestock. 79 State officials contended
the rules would undermine functionally equivalent state programs. Environmental groups, however, supported the proposal
as long overdue regulation of CAFO's.so
On December 16, 2002, EPA announced a final rule for CAFO
regulation. 81 The final rule "will ensure that CAFO's take appropriate actions to manage manure effectively .... " Noteworthy
changes for the new regulation include: (1) all CAFO's are required to apply for an NPDES permit; (2) large poultry operations
are included; (3) all CAFO's covered by an NPDES permit must
develop and implement a nutrient management plan; (4) effluent
76. See Terence J. Centner, The EPA's Proposed Regulations for Animal Feeding
Operations, AGRIC. L. UPDATE (Am. Agric. L. Ass'n), Jan. 2001, at 1; Scott Fancher,
EPA Announces Proposed Rule Changes for Animal Feeding Operations, AGRIC. L. UPDATE (Am. Agric. L. Ass'n), Sept. 2000, at 1.
77. See Tripp Waltz, Concentrated Winter Feeding not Covered by EPA Proposal
on Feedlot Runoff Control, 32 Env't Rep. (BNA) 605 (Mar. 30, 2001).
78. See Susan Bruninga, EPA Proposal Could Require Thousands More Feedlots
to Get Permits, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2659 (Dec. 22, 2000); see also Susan Bruninga,
Draft CAFO Proposal Would Require Co-Permitting, Revise Threshold Limits, 31
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2,316 (Nov. 3, 2000); Susan Bruninga, Most Feedlots Would Have to
Apply for NDPES Permits Under EPA Guidance, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1,724 (Aug. 18,
2000). For industry criticism of the proposed regulation, see Carolyn Whetzel, Proposal to Curb Runoff From Feedlots An 'Administrative Nightmare,' Farmers Say, 32
Env't Rep. (BNA) 495 (Mar. 16, 2001).
79. Whetzel, supra note 78, at 495.
80. Susan Bruninga, Animal Operations: Legality, Strictness Of Proposal To
Tighten Rules On CAFOS Questioned In Copmments, 32 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1,722 (Aug.
31, 2001).
81. 68 Fed. Reg. 7,175- 7,274 (Feb. 12, 2003).
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limitation guidelines regulations will apply only to large CAFO's
(continuing 1000 or more animals).82
Prior to issuing the proposed CAFO rules, the EPA approved
a final project agreement to allow egg producers to develop an environmental management system (EMS) and allow states to issue
general CWA permits for these operations. 83 The EPA viewed the
project as a way to bring more of the operations into the regulatory regime more quickly, pending a change in the CAFO regime
that would include "dry litter" operations. 84 Environmentalists
were critical of the plan, saying that it would "reward some of the
most egregious violators of the Clean Water Act."85
Another blow to the much-maligned TMDL program occurred
when the General Accounting Office issued a report highly critical
of the identification process for impaired waters utilized by the
states. 86 The report, entitled "Water Quality: Inconsistent State
Approaches Complicate Nation's Efforts to Identify Its Most Polluted Waters," was prepared for the House Transportation Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment. 87 The first
major flaw was the reliance on one method of identification-by
either biological, chemical, or physical monitoring-rather than
upon all three as recommended by the U.S. Geological Survey.
Complicating designation are widely differing state definitions of
designated uses in the state water quality standards against
which impairment is measured. For example, Virginia designated
all waters for swimming even though some are not suitable for
swimming for reasons unrelated to water quality, such as inaccessibility and shallowness. 88 When such inherently unswimmable
waters are then affected by bacteria from wildlife use, they are
listed as impaired for a designated use for which they are inherently unsuitable. Listing also varies greatly based upon whether
states utilize data less than five years old (monitoring data) or
82. See id.
83. See Susan Bruninga, Environmental Group Vows Fight Over XL Project for
Egg Producers, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2,325 (Nov. 3, 2000).
84. See id. at 2,326.
85. See id. at 2,325. On local regulation of CAFO's, see generally Thomas R.
Head, III, Local Regulation ofAnimal Feeding Operations: Concerns, Limits, and Options For Southeastern States, 6 ENVTL. LAw. 503 (2000).
86. Mike Ferullo, GAO Report Finds Varying State Approaches to Water Quality
Assessment Affect TMDLs, 33 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 358 (Feb. 15, 2001).
87. GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, WATER QuALITY: INCONSISTENT STATE APPROACHES COMPLICATE NATION'S EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY ITS MOST POLLUTED WATERS

(2002), available at http://www.gao.gov.
88. VA. CoDE. ANN.§ 62.1-44.5 (Michie 2002).
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older than five years (evaluative data), or their use of fish advisories in determining impairment. In November 2001, EPA had released the 2002 Integrated Water Quality Monitoring and
Assessment Report Guidance89 to encourage more uniformity in
assessment, but it would appear the impact of the Report is yet to
be demonstrated. EPA tersely deemed the findings of the GAO's
report to be "reasonable."90
The Myths and the Truths
What can be said with certainty about all of this? Actually,
quite a lot. Despite thirty years of technological controls, many
water bodies and segments fail to meet basic, reasonable goals for
their water quality. The largest single source of contamination by
discharge is nonpoint source pollution. Nonpoint source pollution
continues to be the largest source of contamination, despite section 201 waste treatment planning, sections 106 and 303(e) water
management planning, area-wide management plans under section 208, section 209 basin planning, the nonpoint source pollution
planning program under 319, and general watershed planning.9 1
A significant amount of state, federal and local money has gone
into these programs. There has been a lot of planning. There are
still no federally imposed mandatory controls on nonpoint source
pollution. Agricultural pollution, point source as well as nonpoint
source, has been largely unregulated.9 2
And one more thing, no regulatory agency or governmental
entity wants to do what is clearly necessary to correct the problem. There is nothing unique about the difficulties of implementing the TMDL program other than the political stakes involved.
Every environmental program of the past thirty years has had to
grapple with scientific uncertainty, allocation of enforcement authority, inconsistencies in monitoring, and variances in state and
federal approaches. The irony of states' resistance to the TMDL
program today is that its essential elements are exactly what they
fought to preserve in 1972 when the Clean Water Act was passed
as we know it today.
89. Memorandum from Robert H. Wayland III, Director, Office of Wetlands,
Oceans and Watersheds, to the EPA Regional Water Management Directors (Nov. 19,
2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/2002wqma.pdf.
90. Ferrulo, supra note 86, at 358.
91. For background information see EPA's guidance documents available at http:/
/www.epa.gov/owow/nps/pubs.html (last updated Feb. 3, 2003).
92. See e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).
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The Clean Water Act was passed to correct the failings of the
water-quality based approach of the earlier act-primarily
problems in enforcement due to the difficulty of attributing responsibility for degraded water quality to a single source in the
context of hit-and-miss enforcement litigation. Instead, the 1972
version imposed nationally uniform, technology-based standards
on dischargers in individual permits whose terms could be more
easily monitored and enforced, by governmental and private
plaintiffs.
The 1972 Act, however, did not displace the preexisting system of state water quality standards. State and local governments lobbied ardently for its preservation, asserting that they
were the best stewards for determining and ensuring that localized water quality conditions were what they should be. In essence, imposition of the point source, technology-based controls of
the 1972 Act, which for the next three decades often seemed to be
the ultimate goal of the new act, were intended to be phase one to
get the ball rolling. The legislative intent was to impose nationwide standards, for all their unavoidable localized inefficiency, as
the first layer of regulation, with more stringent regulation to be
imposed through state water quality standards where necessary to
achieve the fishable and swimmable goals of the Act. 93 This point
bears repeating. Preservation of water quality standards served
one critical purpose-to impose stricter controls than those mandated in the other provisions of the act to ensure that the demanding goals of the act for water quality were met when end-of-thepipe controls were not enough.
State and local governments and regulators were well aware
of this purpose and what it would entail; it was for that very reason they fought to reserve the responsibility to themselves rather
than to another stage of federal regulation. If progressively demanding technology-based controls on point sources failed to
achieve water quality goals, inevitably meaningful controls on
nonpoint source pollution would have to be implemented. However phrased, as "best management practices" for example,
nonpoint source controls implicate standards and controls for land
use activities-a regulatory authority state and local governments
were reluctant to cede to the federal government. Rather than do
so, they convinced Congress they were not only the appropriate,

93. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
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but also the best, public authorities to implement the second and
most critical stage of water quality achievement. 94
What then, if anything, has changed since 1972 to make the
states so hesitant if not outright obstructionist toward the
achievement of their own water quality standards? Is the TMDL
program to implement the standards to blame? The states'
problems with and objections to section 303(d) were not tied to any
particular Administration's regulatory implementation of the program. EPA itself refrained from identifying the pollutants for
which TMDLs had to be set, putting the entire program in limbo,
until forced to identify the pollutants by citizen suits. The language of section 303(d), relatively clear by the standards of environmental statutory drafting, remained unchanged from 1972.
When the time came (and passed) for TMDLS to be determined
and implemented, were there difficulties that had not been contemplated or foreseen in 1972 that would explain this change in
attitude?
In his excellent history and analysis of the TMDL program,
Professor Oliver Houck debunks the myth that nonpoint source
pollution is somehow more difficult to regulate. He convincingly
demonstrates that nonpoint source pollution is not more varied,
more site-specific, or more difficult technologically to control. 95
Nevertheless, the TMDLs that have been provided to EPA tend to
avoid controlling nonpoint source pollution, do not calculate their
share of the allocation load, or both. States failed to submit inventories of impaired waters, rank them, promulgate TMDLs, and incorporate them into controls. 96 It took twenty-five years and a
number of citizen suits to compel the states even to begin their
part of the process by listing impaired waters within their jurisdiction. The conclusion is inescapable that the states were proponents of water quality standards implementation until they
actually had to implement them.
The rather scant legislative history in 1972 of the state's support of water quality standards is sufficient to demonstrate that
the states feared the prospect of "federal land use" and fought to
94. 33 u.s.c. § 1281 (2000).
95. HoucK, supra note 1, at 87. For an ambitious article demonstrating how the
TMDL program could remedy nonpoint source pollution, see Paula J. Leibowitz, Land
Use, Land Abuse, and Land Re-Use: A Framework for the Implementation ofTMDL's
for Non-Point Source Polluted Waterbodies, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 97 (2001); see also
Oliver Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program V: Aftershock and Prelude, 32
Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl L. lnst.) 10,385 (Apr. 2002).
96. See generally HoucK, supra note 1.
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retain control over land use by maintaining control over supervision of nonpoint source pollution. The fallacy that nonpoint
source pollution is more difficult to control is invoked to perpetuate the axiom that land use cannot or should not be determined at
the federal level. Land use is determined at the federal level, in a
number of ways in a number of federal programs.9 7 Acknowledgment of this development by its opponents, however, would remove one of their most potent weapons in the political rhetoric of
state versus federal responsibilities. "No federal land use" is more
compelling argumentatively than "not much more federal land
use."
Unfortunately these reluctant state stewards have found a
new ally in their resistance-the Bush administration. The withdrawal of the Clinton administration's regulatory program and
the Bush administration's confident and erroneous assertion that
it would take only 180 days to revise and re-issue it, did not bode
well for the substance of the program. We have had thirty years of
proof that voluntary programs for control ofnonpoint source pollution do not work. There is no legal or practical reason why anationwide program of mandatory controls on nonpoint source
pollution could not and should not be implemented. Imposing
some degree of mandatory controls, by assessing non point sources'
share of the load allocation and requiring some minimal level of
control on those sources only for impaired waters, is a reasonable,
moderate step in water quality improvement-not a radical, unfounded leap.
It is a fairly safe assumption that two critical aspects of the
regulatory program, inclusion of nonpoint sources and deadlines
for implementation, will be weakened or essentially obliterated in
revision of the regulations. EPA was on solid legal ground when it
included nonpoint source pollution in the program's ambit and
particularly so if Chevron retains its vigor; and ten additional
years to implement a program on the books for thirty years seems
fairly reasonable, especially if it is accepted that the difficulty of
controlling nonpoint source pollution is a myth. Noticeably absent
from the political rhetoric is the argument that control of non point
source pollution is unnecessary to improve impaired water quality. The pivotal nature of nonpoint source regulation to water
quality is a truth that is conveniently overlooked. That it cannot
97. See generally
(2002).
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be adequately controlled in voluntary programs without any deadlines for implementation has been proven over a period of thirty
years to be a myth.
Working Forward from the Truth-the Challenge for Local
Governments
Many of the states' criticisms and objections to the TMDL program are problems created by the underlying program for state
designation of uses and criteria for water quality standards. As
the 2002 GAO report concluded, listing of impaired waters is impeded by the wide variances in state definitions of uses and the
data utilized to evaluate impairment.98 This problem is not an
issue of scientific uncertainty but rather a lack of consensus,
which could be at least partially remedied through utilization of
the guidance EPA recently provided.
By 1997, all but three states had submitted some kind of listing to EPA. The states' more vehement objections to listing and
claims of over-inclusiveness coincided with the prospect that EPA
might actually require implementation of TMDLs with respect to
these waters, and for nonpoint source pollution, by a specified
deadline. Section 303(d) is regretfully silent on precisely how and
when implementation ofTMDLs should occur, 99 but it is certainly
not the first time that EPA has filled in a resounding statutory
silence within the confines of Chevron.
However effective state resistance to meaningful implementation and enforcement of the TMDL program might be in the short
term (which may be in fact ten years or more at the current pace),
their resistance seems very short sighted. Allowing states to
maintain the initiative in achieving water quality standards is appearing more and more to be a faulty proposition. Having touted
themselves as not only the best but the only governmental authorities to determine water use and ultimately achieve it, states' inability or unwillingness to carry through on actual
implementation has broader, negative implications for the states'
cooperative authority to regulate the environment and purportedly exclusive authority to regulate land use. Legal challenges to
EPA's authority to regulate nonpoint sources under the TMDL
program begs the question of why state and local governments
have not redressed impaired water quality. There has never been
98. See generally GENERAL AccouNTING
99. 33 u.s.c. § 1313(d) (2000).
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any question that states have the legal authority to regulate the
environment unless preempted by federal regulation. Local governments have increasingly engaged in environmental regulation
through land use measures. With state authority specifically preserved in the 1972 Actl 00 and local authority receiving increased
recognition, challenges to EPA's regulatory authority over
nonpoint sources ultimately places the responsibility for impaired
water quality squarely on state and local governments. It is a responsibility they once welcomed, and now more than ever cannot
deny.
Additionally, delays in implementation of section 303(d) have
highlighted the failings of "water zoning." It may be that the underlying problem is not the TMDL program or even how the uses
and criteria are set, but the water quality approach itself. Water
quality standards were overshadowed by technological standards
and benignly neglected. Now in the spotlight, the opportunity
should be seized to assess what is not working in the approach
itself. With citizen suits looming, and waters still impaired, a system determined to be ineffective could be replaced rather than repaired by Congress. Whatever would take its place-another
layer of technological controls, expanded definitions of point
sources, market-based allowances, incentives-states will have
relinquished control over water quality to federal authorities, regardless of whether EPA chooses to regulate nonpoint source pollution with mandatory controls. The likelihood of expanded
federal authority at the expense of state authority increases in relation to a public perception that the states cannot be trusted with
environmental responsibilities because they are more directly and
less transparently susceptible to political pressure from powerful
lobbies such as agriculture, mining, logging, and construction.
The More Things Change ...
In the intensity of their criticisms of the TMDL program, industry and the states fail to recognize that they stand to lose more
than they gain in eviscerating the program. If nonpoint source
pollution is responsible for water quality impairment, some level
of government must be responsible for effectively controlling
non point source pollution. ·The myths they seek to perpetuate of
the difficulty of controlling these sources and the unacceptability
of federal land use in order to maintain their control of regulation
100. See 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2000).
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do not get either group "off the hook" of improving water qualityquite the contrary. Industry may find itself to be a house divided
between point source dischargers tired of bearing the brunt of regulation and nonpoint source dischargers seeking to evade regulation altogether. Demands for more federal funding, a familiar
refrain, are far less compelling after thirty years of the "carrot"
approach and no budget surplus.
The most recent testament to the agricultural lobby's influence at the federal level is the 2002 Farm Bill. 101 Despite a Republican administration, which is a proclaimed opponent to big
govemment and liberal federal spending, and an attempt in the
prior farm bill to begin eliminating massive federal subsidies, the
newest farm bill is a six-year, $73.5 billion funding frenzy. 102 In
addition to farming and livestock subsidies, the bill quadrupled
the prior budget for conservation programs. 103 The "conservation"
characterization of some of these conservation programs is at best
questionable. 104 Conservation measures may include the construction of waste lagoons by large livestock producers; a transparent opportunity to finance whatever CAFO requirements may
have to be met.
There are signs, however, that agriculture's political grip at
the state level may be slipping as other constituencies exercise
their political muscle. In California two environmental groups
have filed suit to compel the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board to repeal a twenty-year-old exemption for farmers from pollution discharge permit requirements which allows
nonpoint source runoff from agricultural drainage return flows
and storm water discharges to go unmonitored.l 05 Increasingly,
agricultural regulators are finding themselves compelled to respond with new measures of control. For example, health concerns prompted the Oklahoma Agriculture Board to approve
emerging rules defining where poultry houses may be located and
where refuse may be applied to the land. 106 Poultry operators are
101. FARM SEcURITY AND RuRAL INVESTMENT AcT, H.R. No. 108-2646 (2002), available at http://nacdnet.org/govtaff!FB/Combest-Lugar .htm.
102. Id.
103. Susan Bruninga, Farm Bill Accord Would Boost Funding for Wetlands, Environmental Quality Projects, 33 Env't Rep. (BNA) 991 (May 3, 2002).
104. See John H. Davidson, Sustainable Development and Agriculture in the
United States, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,543 (May 2002).
105. Linda Mahoney, Lawsuit Calls for Repeal of Exemption From State Nonpoint
Source Standards, 33 Env't Rep. (BNA) 499 (Mar. 1, 2002).
106. OKLA. ADMIN. CoDE § 35:17-5-5 (2003).
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also required to register with the board prior to large-scale expansions.107 The rules were requested by the Republican state governor.l08 Citizen suits are becoming even more inventive in
compelling action. Recently a Maryland district court held that
EPA had violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 109 by failing
to consult other federal agencies before taking action on water
quality standard revisions and impaired water body beds. 110
There is even one small ray of light from the otherwise bleak perspective of EPA's willingness to compel the states to exercise more
effective controls on nonpoint pollution. Robert Wayland, director
of the EPA Office of Wetlands Oceans, and Watersheds, warned
the Association of State and Interstate Water Pollution Control
Administrators that OMB is moving toward "performance-based
budgeting." 111 Although this is not a new approach at the OMB, it
would be a revolutionary notion for nonpoint source programs. He
said that section 319 had been given a "yellow light" (out of a possible green, yellow, or red) by budget officials and that he wanted
to "issue a word of caution for all of us to make sure the effectiveness of the program is maintained and enhanced." 112 A recent
draft report by EPA has indicated that the Clean Water Act's
state revolving loan fund is increasingly going to control nonpoint
source pollution (as opposed to wastewater treatment plants in
the past), as well as best management practices for storm water
control and runoff from construction and agriculture; wetland,
habitat and riparian corridor protection and restoration efforts;
brownfields remediation; and source water protection. 113 With
nonpoint source pollution, everyone but the polluter pays.
Despite this word of caution concerning OMB to the states,
EPA seems determined to persist in the same approach that has
been so ineffective in the past, but with a new name. EPA wants
to "revitalize" the "continuing planning process" (CPP) of section
303(e). The CPP does little more than consolidate the Clean
Water Act water quality requirements found in other sections into
one plan. The TMDL program would be integrated into this plan107. Id. at§ 35:17-5-3.
108. Mahoney, supra note 105, at 502-03.
109. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
110. Sierra Club v. EPA, 162 F. Supp. 2d 406 CD. Md. 2001).
111. States, EPA Need to Ensure Effectiveness of Nonpoint Source Program, Official Says, 33 Env't Rep (BNA). 590 (Mar. 15, 2002).
112. Id.
113. Money From Revolving Loan Fund Going More to Nonpoint Sources, Draft Report Says, 33 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1107 (May 17, 2002).
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ning process, with its own new name-the watershed rule. The
CPP would be reviewed every five years to calculate the performance of states in implementing its contents. The agency is considering a structure for the "watershed" program that would not
require allocations be made to individual sources. 114 The only
good news with respect to nonpoint pollution is that pollutant allocations would include nonpoint sources. This basic issue itself has
been at the least reconsidered by the agency. States would not
have to have implementation plans-but only provide "reasonable
assurance" their plans would bring waters into attainment at
some unspecified time. States responded to this announcement
saying that they have done "a lot of planning and measuring"
already .115
Withdrawal of the 2000 regulation, absent a new TMDL rule,
leaves in place the 1992 regulation. The 2000 regulation included
more requirements than the 1992 regulation-specifically including schedules for development of TMDLs and more provisions addressing nonpoint source pollution. Mter its withdrawal, the
battle shifted to EPA's draft version of the "Watershed Rule."
This draft rule, widely supported by agriculture, industry, states,
and municipalities, as well as apparently the USDA, would replace the 1992 regulation if adopted. 116 The Watershed Rule
would set specific load limits for point sources, but make only a
"gross allocation" of pollutants to nonpoint source dischargers.
States would divide the allocation among nonpoint discharges as
part of the implementation process, and most likely not subject to
EPA's approval or disapproval, or enforcement by EPA. Organizations supporting the draft rule met with OMB on March 12, 2003,
to figure out why the draft rule had not been proposed. One OMB
official at the meeting was reported as saying OMB officials just
"needed to get to work" after learning of the constituencies' support for the draft rule. EPA officials did not attend the meeting
and indicated the draft was being held up in EPA by negotiations
over how nonpoint sources should be addressed.l 17 On March 14,
many of these same organizations met with the chairman of the
White House Council on Environmental Quality, and came out of
114. Susan Bruninga, Little-Used Planning Provision in Law Eyed as Tool for
TMDL's, Official Says, 33 Env't Rep. (BNA) 591-92 (Mar. 15, 2002).
115. ld.
116. Susan Bruninga, Interagency Review of Draft TMDL Rule Expected to Be
Complete by Mid-May, 34 Env't Rep. (BNA) 705 (Mar. 28, 2003).
117. Susan Bruninga, "Gross Allocation," for Nonpoint Sources in Draft Rule Has
Broad Support, 34 Env't Rep. (BNA) 648 (Mar. 21, 2003).
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that meeting stating that the interagency review of the rule would
be done by mid-May. Both CEQ and EPA denied such a schedule
existed. As one unidentified "agency official" reportedly said, however, the "informal discussions are often more important than the
formal review that is more public." 118
On May 15, 2002, EPA issued for comment its proposed trading policy for impaired and unimpaired waters using water quality standards as a baseline. 119 The policy is devised as a tool in
implementation of the forthcoming TMDL rule. Under the policy
if a source reduces its pollutant loading below the amount allocated in its permit, it would have a credit that could be traded to
another source on that waterbody. 120 One example given is that a
farmer could create credits by changing cropping practices, which
a wastewater treatment plant could then acquire to meet water
quality limits.1 21 The policy, as with any trading policy, raises
questions about the clarity of permit requirements and the extent
to which trading within a waterbody ignores the more localized
impact of pollutant discharges. 122 Ironically, the policy is focused
on trading for nutrients (generally phosphorous and nitrogen) and
sediments.l 23 In other words, the policy is focused on giving point
source dischargers the dubious pleasure of paying non point source
polluters to comply with water quality standards. Point source
dischargers may certainly prefer trading to the rigidity of further
restrictions on their own discharges, but how long will it be before
point source dischargers, particularly publicly owned treatment
works (POTWs), insist that large, profitable, nonpoint source industry dischargers pay for their own pollution?
Dan Tarlock has thoughtfully demonstrated the downward
devolution of environmental protection in general and more specifically in watershed protection. 124 At the federal level the problem in implementing controls on nonpoint source pollution goes
beyond the usual, relatively benign neglect of political gridlock to
118. Bruninga, supra note 116, at 705.
119. 67 Fed. Reg. 34,709 (May. 15, 2002).
120. Id.
121. Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Releases Innovative
Approach to Cleaner Water: 11 Pilots Receiving More than $800,000 in Funding (Jan.
13, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershedltrading/tradingpolicy.
html.
122. See Houck, supra note 10, at 10,399-400.
123. 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,709.
124. A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local Government in Watershed Man·
agement, 20 PACE ENVTL L. REv. (forthcoming Winter 2002).
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a virtual stranglehold on implementation by agriculture, mining
and logging political interests.1 25
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court is sending mixed messages
to local governments with respect to environmental protection.
While the Lopez v. United States 126 and United States v. Morrison127 commerce clause approach reaffirms that land use restrictions are the province of local governments, Taking Clause
jurisprudence, 128 at the very least, discourages all but the most
financially advantaged local governments from engaging in innovation or nontraditional controls. Local governments by their
very nature have limited jurisdiction-how does a locality protect
its water supply when the water supply is in another locality or is
threatened by water appropriation in or outside its jurisdiction?
The TMDL "buck" has been passed back and forth for years
between the state and federal level, but now the buck stops hereat the local level. Whatever the precise formulation of the Bush
administration's TMDL program, committed control of nonpoint
source pollution for the foreseeable future will have to come from
the local level despite the ever present threat of Takings Clause
litigation. Preemption problems also loom if state laws protecting
agriculture are broadly interpreted. 129 Localities do have the incentive that they and their constituencies suffer directly from impairment of water quality. Hopefully they will be less susceptible
to the political influence of large-scale dischargers, or more receptive to citizens' complaints about water quality. They may find
support for their efforts in the renewed initiative for watershed
planning, federal court decisions and litigation demanding more
controls on nonpoint source pollution, and perhaps from a newly
emerging political coalition of municipalities, industrial point
source dischargers, and taxpayers tired of paying for the pollution
of. nonpoint source dischargers. Inter-local coalitions also hold
some promise of coordinated political energy and power in watershed planning, particularly in ensuring that the money Congress
125. Id.
126. 514 u.s. 549 (1995).
127. 529 u.s. 598 (2000).
128. See John D. Echeverria, A Preliminary Assessment of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 31 Envtl. L. Rev. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,112 (Oct. 2001); Michael Allen Wolf,
Pondering Palazzolo: Why Do We Continue to Ask the Wrong Questions?, 32 Envtl. L.
Rev. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,367 (Mar. 2002).
129. Compare Goodell v. Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1998) (preemption), with Borron v. Farrenkoff, 5 S.W.3d 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (no preemption).
See generally MALONE, supra note 97, §§6.06-.07.
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keeps throwing at the problem reaches the local level. Responsibility for water quality entails accountability for past failures and
future improvement. If the states and nonpoint source dischargers want to maintain control over land use practices which contribute most significantly to nonpoint source pollution, at some
point they owe the public some answers as to why they have failed
so far in that responsibility, where the money has gone, and how
that will change. Until then, local governments will be the stewards of our water quality. If they do not or cannot step up to this
task, there is one more certain truth-the water quality of our impaired waters will not improve.

